關於 counter terrorist ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

*** นิวซีแลนด์ยอมรับอดีตสมาชิก ISIS กลับบ้าน ***

ต้นสัปดาห์ที่ผ่านมา นิวซีแลนด์ประกาศว่า จะยอมรับหญิงสาวสัญชาตินิวซีแลนด์ - ออสเตรเลียที่ไปเข้าร่วมกลุ่มก่อการร้ายไอซิสและลูกของเธอ 2 คน กลับประเทศ หลังเธอโดนเพิกถอนสัญชาติออสเตรเลียเมื่อปีที่แล้ว

หญิงคนดังกล่าวได้รับการเปิดเผยชื่อว่า สุฮายรา อเดน อายุ 26 ปี เป็นคนเชื้อชาติโซมาเลีย เกิดที่นิวซีแลนด์ ก่อนย้ายตามครอบครัวไปออสเตรเลียตั้งแต่อายุ 6 ขวบ ทำให้เธอถือทั้งสัญชาตินิวซีแลนด์และออสเตรเลีย อเดนเดินทางไปร่วมกับพวกไอซิสซีเรียในปี 2014 และแต่งงานกับนักรบอิสลามสองคน เป็นชาวสวีเดนทั้งคู่ มีบุตรทั้งหมด 3 คน (เสียชีวิตไปแล้ว 1 คน)

เวลาต่อมา สถานการณ์สู้รบในซีเรียรุนแรงขึ้น จนกระทั่งปี 2017 ไอซิสรบแพ้ สมาชิกแตกพ่ายกระจัดกระจาย บ้างหนีไปประเทศรอบๆ อเดนและลูกเคยอาศัยอยู่ค่ายลี้ภัย ก่อนพยายามหนีจากซีเรียเข้าตุรกีเมื่อต้นปีแต่ก็ถูกจับได้ เมื่อแรกตุรกีให้สถานะเธอเป็นผู้ก่อการร้าย แค่ภายหลังลดโทษแล้วขอให้ประเทศแม่รับครอบครัวดังกล่าวกลับไป

ออสเตรเลียเพิกถอนสัญชาติอเดนไปตั้งแต่ปีที่แล้ว เพราะมองว่าเป็นศัตรูของชาติ ทำให้ภาระตกอยู่กับนิวซีแลนด์ ซึ่งนายกจาซินดา อาร์เดิร์น แห่งนิวซีแลนด์ ประนามออสเตรเลีย และคิดว่าออสเตรเลียควรรับไปดูแลมากกว่า เนื่องจากอเดนใช้ชีวิตอยู่ในออสเตรเลียตั้งแต่เด็กแล้ว อย่างไรก็ตามในที่สุด นายกอาร์เดิร์นก็ตัดสินใจรับอเดนกลับนิวซีแลนด์

“มันไม่ใช่หน้าที่ของตุรกี ออสเตรเลียก็ปฏิเสธครอบครัวนี้ มันเลยเป็นหน้าที่เรา” อาร์เดิร์นกล่าว และย้ำกับสื่อว่า เธอทบทวนการตัดสินใจอย่างดี และเห็นชีวิตของชาวนิวซีแลนด์เป็นสำคัญ ขอให้ประชาชนมั่นใจว่ารัฐจะทำทุกทางให้พวกเขาจะปลอดภัย (จากกลุ่มก่อการร้าย)

ปัญหาประชาชนจากประเทศที่เจริญแล้วไปเข้าสวามิภักดิ์กลุ่มผู้ก่อการร้ายไม่ใช่เรื่องใหม่ เหตุการณ์แบบนี้เกิดขึ้นมาแล้วนับหมื่นครั้ง มีเคสทั้งจากอังกฤษ อเมริกา ออสเตรเลีย ฯลฯ มีผู้วิเคราะห์สาเหตุไว้หลายอย่าง คนเหล่านั้นอาจเป็นผู้นับถือศาสนาอิสลามที่โดนกดขี่ หรือคนศาสนาอื่นๆ ที่เบื่อหน่ายสังคม หรืออาจแค่อยากผจญภัยและลุกขึ้นสู้เพื่อพิสูจน์ความกล้าหาญ

ไม่ว่าจะด้วยเหตุใดก็ตาม ปัจจุบันคนที่เคยเข้ากับไอซิสล้วนต้องเผชิญความทุกข์ยากอยู่มุมใดมุมหนึ่งบนโลก หากไม่อยู่อย่างอดอยากในค่ายลี้ภัย ก็ถูกขังคุก และร้ายที่สุดคือกลายเป็นคนไร้รัฐ หมดสิทธิขั้นพื้นฐานไป

::: อ้างอิง :::

- abc (ดอต) net (ดอต) au/news/2021-02-16/jacinda-ardern-australia-stripping-dual-national-turkey-terror/13159300
- nzherald (ดอต) co (ดอต) nz/nz/isis-terrorist-bride-returns-to-nz-suhayra-aden-will-be-closely-monitored-counter-terrorism-expert-says/
- aljazeera (ดอต) com/news/2021/7/26/new-zealand-to-accept-woman-linked-to-islamic-state
- independent (ดอต) co (ดอต) uk/news/world/australasia/new-zealand-isis-return-australia-b1890574

//香港藝術文化工作者就「港版國安法」的聯署聲明 JOINT STATEMENT OF ARTS & CULTURAL WORKERS IN HONG KONG ON THE PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR HONG KONG
我們是一群在香港從事藝術及文化的工作者，對全國人大於第十三屆人大會議宣佈繞過香港立法程序，授權人大常委會訂立《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》，再按《基本法》第18條納入附件3直接在香港實施的做法，深表震驚、憂慮和憤怒。

此「港版國安法」訂明禁止分裂國家、顛覆國家政權、組織實施恐怖活動和外國及境外勢力干預的行為；中央維護「國家安全」的有關機關根據需要在港設立機構，履行相關職責；規定行政長官應進行「國家安全」推廣教育，並定期向中共政府提交報告。

震驚，是因為新冠肺炎疫情尚未過去，市民還在籌謀抗疫、復考、復工和復課的安排之際，中央出此重手，一錘定音，甚有「快刀斬亂麻」之味；加上過去一個月來自「兩辦內會聲明」、中聯辦自訂不受《基本法》第22條規管、港府三改立場、強行褫奪郭榮鏗內會主席資格、無視議事規則「選出」李慧琼作內會主席、警察肆意以「限聚令」打壓市民和平集會的權利、警隊知法犯法涉及多項嚴重罪行、斬人者被判囚45個月但承認暴動罪的年輕人卻被判4年刑期的司法不公、以政治理由和漠視考生權益的情況下強行取消DSE歷史科試題、至港台《頭條新聞》被封殺等連串事件，教見證著香港極速崩壞的我們咋舌。

憂慮，是因為從事創作和表演的我們，嚴重質疑「港版國安法」通過後還剩多少創作、言論、表達和生存的空間？有關「六四」的的舞台劇會否被視為顛覆國家政權？藝術家參與國際藝術節或邀請外國藝術家到港交流又會否被視為串連外國及境外勢力干預？歌詞中提及「反修例」示威者的行為又會否被打成煽動恐怖活動？在電影中有對白形容女角的衣著風格為「台灣風」又會否被指斥為傷害民族感情、違反一中原則和分裂國家？藝術教育的課程又是否必須加入「國家安全」的元素，否則不獲撥款資助？若然真的墮入法網，將會由誰執法？會否是中央維護「國家安全」而在港設立的機構派員拘捕涉案人士返內地受審和服刑？對於這把「以言入罪」並懸在藝文工作者頭上的刀、繼而產生的寒蟬效應、和日後創作再無「不為政權歌功頌德」的自由，我們感到無比憂慮。

憤怒，是因為一條覆蓋全港700多萬人和影響如斯深遠的法例，竟可以完全繞過立法會、在全不諮詢香港人的情況下，以5個工作天的時間在北京「討論」和表決，實在有違文明的常理！

根據《基本法》第27條，香港居民均享有言論、新聞、出版的自由。可是「港版國安法」通過後，藝文工作者勢必人人自危，處處擔心觸碰「紅線」，事事自我審查，嚴重打擊藝術創作及言論表達的自由，阻礙本地及海外的文化藝術交流，甚至威脅藝文工作者的人身安全，令香港作為國際文化大都會的形象嚴重受損，並帶來無可估計的經濟損失。

故此，我們強烈反對全國人大在本週四 (5月28) 投票通過「港版國安法」。而人大代表中的馬逢國先生，我們雖知你貴為港區人大代表團團長，但同時亦是香港立法會多年的「體育、演藝、文化及出版」界議員、我們無可奈何下的「業界代表」。你應明白要創作優秀的文化、藝術作品，必須要有一個容讓自由表達、自由創作的環境；而藝文創作的使命，便是思考及衝破種種藩籬，帶領人類文明走向更高的層次。可是，你有否感到「港版國安法」與上述價值背道而馳？有否知悉我們上述的震驚、憂慮和憤怒？在本週四表決「港版國安法」時、閣下將如何投票？你有否打算在投票前諮詢並反映香港藝術文化界的意見？我們亦在此促請馬先生盡早回覆上述的問題，並拒絕在本週四投票通過「港版國安法」。

We are a group of arts and cultural workers in Hong Kong. We are writing to express our shock, worry and anger at the announcement by the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) to bypass the legislative process in Hong Kong and authorise the NPC Standing Committee to create a national security law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) for implementation as part of Annex III under Article 18 of the Basic Law.

The proposed national security law prohibits secession, subversion, organised terrorism, and intervention by foreign countries and foreign forces; allows Central Government authorities overseeing national security to set up organisations in Hong Kong if necessary; and requires the HKSAR to promote national security education and report regularly to the Central Government.

Shock, because the Central Government is acting so heavy-handedly in its attempt to arrive at a swift, finalised solution, at a time when the Coronavirus pandemic is not yet over and the people of Hong Kong are still struggling to stay safe, resume work and reopen school. Adding to the shock is our speechless horror at the rapid collapse of our way of life, evident in a series of events in the past month including: remarks made by the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council (HKMAO) and the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government (LOCPG) about the operation of the Legislative Council House Committee; the Hong Kong Government’s three flip-flopping statements about the LOCPG’s claim that it is not subject to Article 22 of the Basic Law; the forcible removal of Dennis Kwok and the unprocedural election of Starry Lee as the president of the Legislative Council House Committee; the police’s abuse of the group gathering ban to restrict the right to peaceful assembly; recent reports of police officers knowingly breaking the law and committing serious offences; the injustice of sentencing a protester to four years in prison for rioting as opposed to the lenient 45 months meted out to an anti-protest man for stabbing three citizens; the Government’s decision to scrap a question from the Diploma of Secondary Education (DSE) history paper on political grounds and in disregard of the rights of candidates; as well as the suspension of Radio Television Hong Kong’s satirical show Headliner under government pressure.

Worry, because we seriously question how much room would remain for free speech and artistic expression. Will a stage drama about June 4 be regarded as a subversion of state power? Will participating in an international arts festival or inviting foreign artists to Hong Kong for artistic exchange be considered as inducing intervention by foreign countries or foreign forces? Will lyrics about anti-extradition protests be labelled as inciting terrorist activities? Will film dialogue referring to a female character’s costume as ‘Taiwanese’ be accused of hurting national feelings, violating the principle of one China and splitting the country? Will arts education programmes be funded only if ‘national security’ elements are included? Who will enforce the law if it is broken? Will offenders be arrested by personnel from organisations set up by the Central Government authorities overseeing national security? Will they be sent to the mainland for trial and sentence? We are extremely worried that speech crimes, like a sword of Damocles hanging over our heads, will create chilling effects and remove the freedom not to glorify the existing regime.

Anger, because a far-reaching law affecting more than 7 million citizens is to be ‘deliberated’ and voted on in Beijing in just five working days, bypassing the Legislative Council, without any consultation of the people of Hong Kong, and in utter disregard of the standard of civilisation!

According to Article 27 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication. However, the proposed national security law will put arts and cultural workers at risk of violating prohibitions and create a climate of fear and self-censorship that harms artistic expression, free speech, cultural exchange and even personal security. The consequent damage to the image of Hong Kong as a cultural metropolis and to the economy will be incalculable.

Thus we strongly object to the NPC voting for the proposed national security law on this coming Thursday (28 May). Attending the NPC as the convenor of Hong Kong Delegation is Mr Ma Fung-kwok, who is a long-time Hong Kong Legislative Councillor for Sports, Performing Arts, Culture and Publication Constituency. Mr Ma, you are supposed to ‘represent’ us (whether we like it or not); you must understand that creativity thrives on a free environment, and that the mission of arts and cultural workers is to push boundaries and explore the realms beyond. Don’t you think the proposed national security law runs counter to the values we cherish? Are you aware of the shock, worry and anger we feel? How will you vote on the proposed national security law next Thursday? Do you intend to consult and reflect the views of the arts and cultural workers in Hong Kong before you vote? We therefore also urge that Mr Ma reply to the above questions as soon as possible and refuse to vote for the proposed national security law on this coming Thursday.//

【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿，但國際線十分重要，不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻，願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機：

While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.

After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.

This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.

The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws

Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.

The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.

Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”

In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.

Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.

Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates

An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?

The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”

If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.

Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.

Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”

Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.

Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship

Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.

In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.

Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.

The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.

These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.

▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
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《虹彩六號：圍攻行動》是廣受好評的第一人稱射擊遊戲品牌《湯姆克蘭西之虹彩六號》最新系列作品，帶來高致命性、仰賴戰術策略、充滿團隊合作及爆破場面的核心遊玩體驗。

Tom Clancy's Rainbow Six Siege is a first-person tactical shooter, in which players take control of an operator from the Rainbow team, a counter-terrorist unit. Different operators have different nationalities, perks, abilities and equipment.

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► 各種生活動態都會貼在FB粉絲頁 http://www.facebook.com/tttd3
► twitch直播台 http://zh-tw.twitch.tv/kamiyu666
► 全部遊戲播放清單 http://goo.gl/DUs8Ar
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► 同系列影片清單在此 https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLEzqZq_wDhpd0I1_vj5K0RY8RExjeLbkQ
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
哈囉~我是阿津，歡迎來觀看我的遊戲實況直播影片，有任何意見或建議，可以直接留言或寄信給我。
►►訂閱頻道隨時接收最新影片動態~
►►►請幫忙分享影片與推廣，謝謝大家~

《虹彩六號：圍攻行動》是廣受好評的第一人稱射擊遊戲品牌《湯姆克蘭西之虹彩六號》最新系列作品，帶來高致命性、仰賴戰術策略、充滿團隊合作及爆破場面的核心遊玩體驗。

Tom Clancy's Rainbow Six Siege is a first-person tactical shooter, in which players take control of an operator from the Rainbow team, a counter-terrorist unit. Different operators have different nationalities, perks, abilities and equipment.

pc steam uplay ps4 xboxone 第一人稱戰術射擊
► 各種生活動態都會貼在FB粉絲頁 http://www.facebook.com/tttd3
► twitch直播台 http://zh-tw.twitch.tv/kamiyu666
► 全部遊戲播放清單 http://goo.gl/DUs8Ar
► 副頻道 http://www.youtube.com/user/kamiyu665
► 同系列影片清單在此 https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLEzqZq_wDhpd0I1_vj5K0RY8RExjeLbkQ
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
哈囉~我是阿津，歡迎來觀看我的遊戲實況直播影片，有任何意見或建議，可以直接留言或寄信給我。
►►訂閱頻道隨時接收最新影片動態~
►►►請幫忙分享影片與推廣，謝謝大家~